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Abstract
The contractor’s procrastinating behavior owing to the psychology of cost salience exposes
the project manager to the risk of time delay, which brings a significant challenge in project
manager’s incentive contract design. This paper considers that a project manager pays a
contractor over a menu of deadline-based incentive contracts to conduct a project which
consists of two sequential tasks. The contractor is endowed with private cost salience
information and unobservable efforts. The subjective assessments about the cost salience
degree and the project variability are characterized as uncertain variables. Within the
framework of uncertainty theory and principal-agent theory, we investigate the impacts
of the existence of cost salience and information asymmetry on the incentive contract and
the project manager’s profit. We confirm that cost salience can impel the project manager
to lower both the fixed payment under full information and the penalty/incentive rate
under pure moral hazard. Interestingly, we find that moral hazard can weaken the extent
of inverse impact caused by the existence of cost salience for the project manager. Our
study also shows that, for mitigating the adverse impacts brought by moral hazard, the
project manager is more profitable to provide effort incentive when the contractor’s efforts
are more productive or the project risk is in a higher level. Finally, other suggestions for
mitigating the detrimental impacts brought by adverse selection are provided by numerical
experiments.
Keywords: Uncertainty theory, Incentive mechanism, Project management, Information
asymmetry, Cost salience
1. Introduction
Completion on time is generally identified as the key indicator of project success.
Thus, it is ideal that a project is completed without time delay. However, in practice,
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achieving this major objective is very difficult because of procrastinating behavior and
uncertainty environment. For example, Assaf and Al-Hejji (2006) conducted a survey on
time performance of different types of construction projects in Saudi Arabia. They con-
cluded that, on account of the contractor’s effort procrastination and project’s volatilities,
70% of projects experienced time overrun and the average time overrun was between 10%
and 30% of the original contract duration. However, in academic and industrial domain,
project managers rarely consider the contractor’s procrastinating behavior owing to the
psychology of cost salience. In fact, the contractor has a tendency to procrastinate as he
attaches greater salience to immediate-term costs when allocating efforts over time (Wu
et al. 2014), which may enlarge the project duration. Therefore, from the perspective of
the project manager, how to motivate the contractor with cost salience to complete the
project in a shorter time has been an urgent issue under uncertainty environment.
Deadline-based incentive contract, as a contractual strategy to enhance project’s time
performance, has received an increasing recognition from researchers and practitioners
(e.g., Tang et al. 2015 and Zhang 2016). Many state transportation departments use
deadline-incentive contracts, for example, Washington State Department of Transporta-
tion (WSDOT) reports it has used deadline-based incentive contracts with favorable out-
comes to reward subcontractors for early completion of a project phase and/or penalize
a subcontractor for late completion or failure to meet the deadline (Walker 2010). Nev-
ertheless, introducing the contractor’s procrastinating behavior caused by the psychology
of cost salience into the project management and deal with cost salience by the deadline-
based incentive contracts rarely have been studied. The presence of the contractor’s cost
salience brings a significant challenge in project manager’s incentive contract design, es-
pecially when the project contains sequential tasks because the contractor may think he
can put off more work to the later task.
In particular, since the degree of tendency to procrastinate (i.e., the cost salience
degree) is one kind of the contractor’s own psychological states and his effort level also
cannot be monitored by the project manager, the project manager neither knows the
contactor’s truthful cost salience degree nor observes his effort level, which results in
adverse selection and moral hazard in project management. Furthermore, in the setting
of hiring a new contractor to implement a project, there is usually no observed historical
data about the project’s volatilities and the contactor’s cost salience degree. This fact
leads to that the probability distribution cannot be estimated from the frequency due
to the lack of them. Hence, probability theory is no longer applicable to be used to
characterize these incomplete information. Whereas uncertainty theory founded by Liu
(2007) has been proved to be appropriate to depict subjective assessment and model
human uncertainty by inviting some domain experts to evaluate the belief degree that
each event will occur. Thus, we characterize the project’s volatilities and the contactor’s
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private cost salience degree as uncertain variables and focus on the optimal time-incentives
under dual asymmetric information in an uncertain principal-agent setting.
The above discussion gives rise to three research questions. First, what are the opti-
mal deadline-based contracts the project manager should design with serial tasks in the
presence of contractor’s private cost salience information and unobservable efforts? Sec-
ond, how does the existence of cost salience influence the project manager’s profit and
optimal solutions? Third, how do the contractor’s private cost salience information and
unobservable efforts affect the project manager’s profit and the contracting strategies,
respectively?
In this paper, we consider an agency problem in which a project manager desires to
employ a contractor to conduct a project. The completion time of the project which
consists of two serial tasks is determined by the contractor’s efforts. Furthermore, as the
contractor attaches greater cost salience to the present moment when allocating efforts
over time, he has a tendency to procrastinate and delay work over two tasks. The con-
tractor’s cost salience degree is his private information and his efforts are unobservable
to the project manager. The project manager must design the effective deadline-based
contract for the contactor to urge him to reveal truthful cost salience degree and complete
the project on time. To address these above proposed issues, the optimal solutions are
studied initially without cost salience. Subsequently, we investigate the optimal solutions
with cost salience under four information cases (full information, only moral hazard, only
adverse selection and dual asymmetric information). Afterwards, we investigate the im-
pacts of both the existence of cost salience and the asymmetric information on the optimal
profits of the project manager. With the analytical results and numerical experiments,
we establish the following main findings.
First, we characterize the optimal deadline-based incentive contracts for the project
manager in the absence of cost salience and in the presence of cost salience under differ-
ent information cases, respectively. We find that the presence of cost salience leads to
lower fixed payment under full information and lower penalty/incentive rate under pure
moral hazard for the first task. However, it makes no difference in the incentive contract
for the second task irrespective of the information structure. The solutions also suggest
that, under dual symmetric information and pure adverse selection, the project manager
prefers to only provide the contractor with fixed compensations and no penalty/incentive
rate. In contrast, under pure moral hazard, the project manager would like to distort the
penalty/incentive rate upward in the first task so as to motivate the contractor to im-
plement proper effort. Furthermore, under dual asymmetric information, we characterize
the optimal menu of deadline-based incentive contracts so that the project manager can
dynamically update the contracts based on the hazard rate and the project risk.
Second, by examining the impacts of cost salience on the project manager’s profit, we
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identify the values of cost salience. The results confirm that, in the absence of cost salience,
the project manager’s profit is always higher than that with cost salience, i.e., the existence
of cost salience always brings about a loss of profit for the project manager. Besides, the
project manager suffers from greater loss along with the contractor’s higher degree of cost
salience. As an interesting finding, we show that moral hazard can weaken the extent of
inverse impact caused by the existence of cost salience for the project manager. We also
illustrate that lower effort productivity of the contractor in the first task is helpful for the
project manager to reduce the loss caused by the cost salience. What is more, the cost
salience’s detrimental impacts are decreasing in the project marginal time revenue under
full information and increasing in the project marginal time revenue under moral hazard.
Third, by comparing the manager’s profit under different information cases, we are able
to pinpoint interesting interplays between the asymmetric information and the manager’s
profit. By examining the information rent induced by the contractor’s private information
about his cost salience degree, we find that it is more favorable to the project manager to
screen the contractor’s cost salience degree with higher effort productivity, higher project
marginal time revenue, higher coefficient of risk aversion and lower project risk in the first
task. What is more, compared to the case without moral hazard, the project manager
is more beneficial to learn the contractor’s truthful cost salience degree under moral
hazard. With regard to the impacts of contractor’s unobservable efforts, we find that, for
mitigating the adverse impacts brought by moral hazard, the project manager is more
profitable and willing to provide incentive mechanism for contracting on the contractor’s
efforts and impelling his optimal efforts when the efforts are more productive or the project
risk is in a higher level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant lit-
erature. In Section 3, we describe the problem formulation and notations. Section 4,
as a benchmark, we first analyze the optimal solutions without cost salience under full
information and under moral hazard, respectively. In Section 5, we correspondingly dis-
cuss the solutions with cost salience under four information cases. Section 6 illustrates
the impacts of cost salience’s existence, private information about the cost salience and
unobservable efforts on the project manager’s profits. We present this paper’s conclusion
in Section 7. All the proofs are relegated to the “Appendix”.
2. Literature Review
This paper is related to three streams of literature: time-incentive literature in project
management, the psychology literature on procrastination behavior and the literature on
uncertain principal-agent problems.
The time-incentive problem in project management has been studied extensively by
both academics and practitioners. According to Bubshait (2003), clients can provide
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time incentive for early completion. Kwon et al. (2010) investigate how the time-based
contract can achieve optimal project channel coordination. Tang et al. (2015) examine
two time-related incentive project management contracts when the manager conducts a
reverse auction. Chen et al. (2015) propose a new time-incentive payment contract for
stochastic projects defined by a series of stages or tasks and that contract can be used
to find the optimal due date. Kerkhove and Vanhoucke (2016) provide a quantitative
framework for selecting the optimal environment to adopt duration incentive contract.
Zhang (2016) explores the value of deadlines from the agency-theoretic perspective and
derives conditions under which the firm should impose such deadlines. We complement
this line of literature by taking the agent’s procrastinating behavior caused by the psy-
chology of cost salience into consideration and analyzing how to design deadline-based
incentive contract to overcome it and avoid time delay.
Past research has studied the source of procrastination in the psychology literature.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) posit that procrastination results from people’s psycho-
logical tendency to overvalue current utilities, i.e., individuals tend to defer work because
they attach a greater salience to the present moment, amplifying the costs of immediate
effort. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) find that people recognize their self-control prob-
lems and attempt to control their procrastination by setting deadlines for themselves.
Steel (2007) conducts meta-analysis of procrastination’s possible causes and effects and
finds that strong and consistent predictors of procrastination are task delay, self-efficacy,
and impulsiveness. Ericson (2017) shows that anticipated reminders can induce addi-
tional procrastination, lowering both welfare and the probability the task is completed.
Ferrari and Roster (2018) suggest that general procrastination tendencies may enable a
lifelong pattern of responses to one’s environment that become increasingly maladaptive
throughout the life cycle. Although economists typically point out procrastination as a
strong behavioral regulator because of cost salience, fewer researchers explicitly take this
psychological bias into formal modeling consideration in the time-based project, especially
when the psychological bias is individual’s private information. Our study introduces the
contractor’s psychological state of cost salience into project management and discusses
the impacts of cost salience on the project manager’s contractual strategy and profit.
The last stream of literature focuses on how to use uncertainty theory to develop the
principal-agent models. Uncertainty theory is founded by Liu (2007) who gives the basic
concepts. Recent years, uncertainty theory has become a branch of axiomatic mathematics
for dealing with modeling human uncertainty. Liu (2013) proposes an insurance risk
model with uncertain claims. Liu et al. (2015) view the foreign exchange rate as an
uncertain processes and discuss the uncertain currency option problems. Gao et al. (2016)
employ the theory of uncertain Shapley value to analyze a profit allocation problem of
supply chain alliance. The concerns of using uncertainty theory to develop the principal-
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agent model have been elaborated in a number of papers. Mu et al. (2013) establish an
uncertain principal-agent model to maximize the expected utility of the enterprise under
incentive feasible mechanism, in which the rural migrant worker’s profit is characterized
as an uncertain variable. Fu et al. (2018) consider an agency problem where a firm
employs a manager to implement a R&D project and both the subjective assessments
about the manager’s risk aversion degree and the project variability are characterized
as uncertain variables. Zhou et al. (2018) study a model of principal-agent problem
under loss aversion and inequity aversion under uncertainty theory. Chen et al. (2018)
investigate the impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts
under different information structures. Different from these studies, we characterize the
project’s volatilities and the contactor’s private cost salience degree as uncertain variables
and investigate the impact of dual asymmetric information on performance in an uncertain
principal-agent setting.
3. Model Formulation
Consider a risk-neutral project manager (she) engages a risk-averse contractor (he) to
complete a new project that consists of two tasks. The two tasks must be performed in
sequence for technological reasons and the completion time in each task which influences
the project’s value mainly depends on the contractor’s effort level. The contractor’s effort
division over the course of the project is not contractible upfront by the manager. What
is more, the contractor has a tendency to procrastinate, as he has psychological bias
of attaching greater salience to immediate-term costs when allocating efforts over time
(Wu et al. 2014). In reality, however, the manager cannot distinguish the contractor’s
exact cost salience degree. Therefore, it is necessary for the project manager to design
an incentive contract to induce the contractor to exert proper effort for shortening the
project duration and report truthful cost salience degree for avoiding procrastinate.
3.1. Project’s completion time
The project is conducted by two serial tasks both of which can be accelerated the
contractor’s effort levels. Moreover, the uncertain completion time Ti of the task i depends
on the contractor’s an unobservable effort ei as well as the project risk. Thus, we define
the project duration of task i as
Ti = t0i − t1iei + εi, i = 1, 2,
where the uncertain component εi with mean 0 and variance σ
2
i represents the risk of task
i associated with development and commercialization of the project. In the context of
conducting new project without historical data, the project manager cannot distinguish
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the project’s accurate risk and has to invite some domain experts to evaluate the belief
degree that each event will occur. Thus, we characterize the project’s volatilities as
uncertain variables. Furthermore, we assume ε1 and ε2 are independent. The parameter
t0i > 0 denotes the maximum possible project duration and the coefficient t1i > 0 measures
the marginal impact of the contractor’s effort on reducing the completion time of task i,
i = 1, 2.
Because the project consists of two serial tasks, task 2 is started immediately after
task 1 is complete. Therefore, the project’s total completion time T = T1 + T2. When
the project is completed, the project manager will subsequently receive a project’s value
V (T ). We follow the usual modeling assumptions of the time-cost trade-off literature
(Tang et al. 2015 and Yang et al. 2016) and assume that the project’s value V (T )
to the manager is a linear, decreasing function of the project completion time T . So
that V (T ) = a − bT where a > 0 indicates the base revenue of the project and b > 0
means the marginal revenue/loss the project manager gains when the project duration is
reduced/increased by one time unit.
3.2. Cost salience and effort procrastination
When invited to accomplish a project with serial tasks, the contractor usually has a
tendency to procrastinate, since he would attach greater salience to the immediate-term
costs when allocating efforts over time (Wu et al. 2014). As shown in Akerlof (1991):
Suppose one can finish a task freely at an earlier time or at a later time with a benefit of
v and a cost of c. Finishing the task at the earlier time brings a net payoff of only v− θc
where θ > 1 captures that the individual would attach greater psychological salience
to the immediate cost, while the net payoff of finishing at the later time is v − c. As
a consequence, the individual prefers to delay work whenever possible. Furthermore, a
bigger θ imposes higher impact of cost salience on the individual utility and results in the
individual’s procrastination more likely.
In our model, the contractor has a convex cost c(ei) = e
2
i /2 by inputting effort level
ei in task i, i = 1, 2. The assumption of a quadratic cost function is made not only
for expositional convenience but also in accordance with the practical fact, which has
been used in Dutta (2008) and Xiao and Xu (2012). Owing to the cost salience, the
contractor would overvalue the effort cost in task 1 which is completed in the earlier time
relative to task 2. As a result, the contractor’s effort cost valued behaviorally by himself
is θe21/2 + e
2
2/2. Moreover, the contractor’s cost salience factor θ is generally his private
information and the project manager does not know the exact degree. Thus, the project
manager can only make the subjective assessment about the contractor’s cost salience
which is characterized by an uncertain variable X with distribution F (x) on the interval
[θ, θ], where 0 6 θ < θ < +∞. Let f(x) = dF (x)/dx. We further impose the hazard rate
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(HR) h(x) = F (x)/f(x) as an increasing function so that the project revenue is increasing
in the contractor’s effort level. This monotonicity condition has been commonly used in
the private information agency literature (Mu et al. 2013), and many distributions,
including the linear, the zigzag, the normal, and any other distribution with single-peak
(see Liu 2007 for details), have this property.
3.3. Compensation scheme
Note that the contractor’s real cost salience is unknown and his effort is unobservable
to the project manager, thus, neither his cost salience nor effort is contractible. Because
the project completion time is verifiable and contractible, for impelling the contractor
to induce short completion time and improved performance, we consider the contractor’s
incentive compensation to be contingent on the observable completion time T1 and T2.
Different from Wu et al. (2014) who considered how to reduce the quality loss because
of cost salience, we intend to study how to reduce the complete time in the presence
of cost salience. In the following, we will examine the deadline-based incentive project
management contracts when the contractor conducts unobservable efforts in two serial
tasks with private cost salience information. For tractability and practically, we shall focus
on the case of linear incentives/disincentives compensation form for easily implementing in
practice and obtaining closed-form expressions of project manager’s optimal contracting
strategies and expected payoff.
The contractor receives a payment Wi(θ, Ti) = αi(θ) − βi(θ)(Ti − di) for task i from
the manager upon finishing the project, where αi(θ) is the fixed wage, βi(θ) > 0 is
the penalty/incentive rate and di is the due date (or deadline), i = 1, 2. Such a typi-
cal deadline-based incentive contract has been used extensively in building construction,
software development and new product development projects (Tang et al. 2015). For
example, to repair the Santa Monica Freeway within d = 180 days after the Northridge
earthquake in 1994, the City of Los Angeles (the project manager) provided C.C. Mayers,
Inc. (the contractor) with an incentive (disincentive) of $200, 000 per day for early (late)
completion and a fixed payment $10, 000, 000. In this case, the contractor’s payment takes
the form of 15, 000, 000− 200000(T − 180). Finally, the winning contractor C.C. Mayers,
Inc. completed the repair 74 days before the 180-day deadline by exerting extra efforts
(e.g., extra crews and extra equipment) and earned a $14.5 million bonus (Boarnet 1998).
The sequence of events illustrated in Figure 1 is as follows: (1) the contractor privately
learns his own type of cost salience; (2) the project manager offers a menu of compensation
contracts; (3) the contractor decides whether to accept the contract or not; (4) if the
contractor accepts the contract, he reports his cost salience information to the project
manager and exerts efforts to complete the project; (5) the project manager pays the
contractor according to the realized project duration and the chosen contract.
8
Figure 1: Sequence of events
3.4. The incentives problem
The project manager’s expected profit is the project’s value net of the compensation
payed to the contractor, which can be written as
E[V (T )−W1(θ, T1)−W2(θ, T2)].
We assume the contractor’s risk preference is constant absolute risk-averse (CARA).
In our linear contracting framework, the contractor’s expected utility can be conveniently
represented by his certainty equivalent value which takes the familiar mean-variance form.
Let CEi(θ, θ˜) denote the contractor’s certainty equivalent in the task i when he self-selects
the contract (αi(θ˜), βi(θ˜)) by reporting his cost salience θ˜, but his true type is θ, i=1,2.
CEi(θ, θ˜) = αi(θ˜)− βi(θ˜)(Ti − di)− 1
2
ρβi(θ˜)
2σ2i −
[1 + (i− 2)(1− θ)]e2i
2
, i = 1, 2,
where ρ > 0 is the contractor’s coefficient of risk aversion.
By the same way, the contractor’s certainty equivalent value in the task i by reporting
his cost salience θ truthfully is given by
CEi(θ, θ) = αi(θ)− βi(θ)(Ti − di)− 1
2
ρβi(θ)
2σ2i −
[1 + (i− 2)(1− θ)]e2i
2
, i = 1, 2.
Because the contractor’s efforts in two tasks are unobservable to the project manager,
the manager should also design an incentive mechanism to make the contractor exert
optimal efforts in both tasks. The contractor’s objective is to induce an execution plan
(e1, e2) that minimizes the sum of effort cost of completing the project. The incentive
compatibility constraints for moral hazard are given by
ei = argmax
eˆi>0
CEi(θ, θ), ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2. (IC1)
Furthermore, from the perspective of project manager, to ensure the contractor to
reveal his cost salience θ truthfully rather than claim to possess some other levels of θ˜,
the incentive compatibility constraints for adverse selection should be introduced by
CEi(θ, θ) > CEi(θ, θ˜), ∀θ, θ˜ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2. (IC2)
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The contractor accepts the project manager’s contract if and only if his expected
utility exceeds the reservation utility obtained from the outside option which is assumed
to be zero. Thus, the contractor’s individual rationality constraints are given by
CEi(θ, θ) > 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2. (IR)
4. Optimal Solutions without Cost Salience
To explore the impacts of the contractor’s psychological preference for delaying work
on the deadline-based contract and the project manager’s profit, as a benchmark, we first
study the optimal solutions without cost salience. In the following, according to whether
the project manager can observe the contractor’s efforts or not, two information scenarios
are established.
4.1. Optimal solution without cost salience under perfect information
In this scenario, the contractor does not have cost salience (θ = 1) and his efforts are
observable to the project manager, which transforms our analysis into a dual symmetric
information problem. Thus, the project manager’s objective is to maximize her profit
by offering a first-best contract (αi, βi, ei), i = 1, 2. Consequently, the project manager’s
problem is 
max
(αi,βi,ei)
E[V (T )−W1(θ, T1)−W2(θ, T2)]
subject to:
CEi(θ, θ) > 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2. (IR)
Proposition 1. Under dual symmetric information without cost salience, the contractor’s
optimal effort levels for task 1 and task 2 is e1 = bt11 and e2 = bt12, respectively. The
optimal fixed compensations α1 =
b2t211
2
and α2 =
b2t212
2
and the optimal penalty/incentive
rates β1 = β2 = 0.
As shown in Proposition 1, because the project manager can observe the contractor’s
efforts, the manager can require him to exert the optimal effort level which is equal to
his effort productivity multiplied by the project revenue earned by unit reduced time. In
this case, the project manage does not need to give the contractor penalty/incentive rate
(β1 = β2 = 0). Moreover, as the contractor’s individual rationality constraint is binding,
which leads to the fixed wage paid to the contractor in each task is equal to his cost of
effort. Based on Proposition 1, we can derive the manager’s optimal expected profit in
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under dual symmetric information without cost salience, the project man-
ager’s optimal expected profit
Π1 = a− b(t10 + t20) + b
2
2
(
t211 + t
2
12
)
.
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4.2. Optimal solution without cost salience under moral hazard
In this scenario, the contractor does not have cost salience and his efforts are unobserv-
able to the project manager, which transforms our analysis into a moral hazard problem.
Thus, the project manager’s problem is
max
(αi,βi)
E[V (T )−W1(θ, T1)−W2(θ, T2)]
subject to:
ei = argmax
eˆi>0
CEi(θ, θ), ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2 (IC1)
CEi(θ, θ) > 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2. (IR)
Using the first-order condition for the optimal effort levels and substituting the contrac-
tor’s participation constraint into the manager’s objective function, we obtain an un-
constrained decision problem. Solving for the optimal penalty/incentive rates and fixed
compensations leads to the following optimal solution:
Proposition 2. Under moral hazard without cost salience, the manager’s optimal effort
levels ei =
bt31i
t21i+ρσ
2
i
, i=1,2. The optimal fixed compensations αi =
bt21i(t0i−di)
t21i+ρσ
2
i
− b2t41i(t21i−ρσ2i )
2(t21i+ρσ
2
i )
2
and the optimal penalty/incentive rates βi =
bt21i
t21i+ρσ
2
i
, i=1,2.
Proposition 2 provides us with closed form of the optimal deadline-based incentive con-
tract under moral hazard without cost salience. Note that the optimal penalty/incentive
rate βi is decreasing in risk attitude ρ and the task risk σi, i = 1, 2, the project manager
prefers lowing the optimal penalty/incentive rate to motivate the contractor when he is
more risk averse and the task is in higher risk. What is more, the optimal penalty/incentive
rate βi increase in effort productivity t1i, i = 1, 2. Thus, the project manager would raise
the optimal penalty/incentive rate when the contractor’s effort productivity in each task
is higher. Based on Proposition 2, we can derive the manager’s optimal expected profit
in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Under moral hazard without cost salience, the project manager’s optimal
expected profit
Π2 = a− b(t10 + t20) + 1
2
b2
2∑
i=1
t41i
t21i + ρσ
2
i
.
5. Optimal Solutions with Cost Salience
In this section, we consider the contractor has cost salience. To explore the impact of
information asymmetry on the project manager’s contractual strategies and revenue, in
the following, we would investigate the optimal solutions in four information cases.
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5.1. Optimal solution with cost salience under dual symmetric information
In this scenario, the contractor has cost salience (θ > 1) which is a public information
and the contractor’s efforts are observable to the project manager, which transforms
our analysis into a dual symmetric information problem in the presence of cost salience.
Consequently, the project manager’s problem is
max
(αi,βi,ei)
E[V (T )−W1(θ, T1)−W2(θ, T2)]
subject to:
CEi(θ, θ) > 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2. (IR)
Proposition 3. Under dual symmetric information with cost salience, the manager’s
optimal effort levels for task 1 and task 2 is e1 =
bt11
θ
and e2 = bt21, respectively. The
optimal fixed compensation α1 =
b2t211
2θ
for task 1 and α2 =
b2t212
2
for task 2 and the optimal
penalty/incentive rates β1 = β2 = 0.
Proposition 3 suggests that the optimal effort level (e2), the fixed payment (α2) for the
second task and the optimal penalty/incentive rates (β1 and β2) under dual symmetric
information with cost salience are the same as those under dual symmetric information
without cost salience. That is, the contractor’s cost salience makes no difference in these
strategic decisions under full information. However, compared with the optimal solutions
without cost salience under full information, the project manager would let the contractor
exert lower effort (lower e1) and offer a lower fixed payment (lower α1) for the first task
because of the existence of cost salience (θ > 1). Based on Proposition 3, we can derive
the manager’s optimal expected profit in the following corollary
Corollary 3. Under dual symmetric information with cost salience, the project manager’s
optimal expected profit
Π3 = a− b(t10 + t20) + b
2
2
(
t12 +
t211
θ
)
.
5.2. Optimal solution with cost salience under pure moral hazard
In this scenario, the contractor’s cost salience degree is public information but his
efforts are unobservable to the project manager, which transforms our analysis into a
pure moral hazard problem. Consequently, the project manager’s problem is to choose the
optimal incentive contract to maximize the project’s profit net of compensation expenses.
max
(αi,βi)
E[V (T )−W1(θ, T1)−W2(θ, T2)]
subject to:
ei = argmax
eˆi>0
CEi(θ, θ), ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2 (IC1)
CEi(θ, θ) > 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2. (IR)
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Proposition 4. Under moral hazard with symmetric cost salience information, the opti-
mal fixed compensation α1 =
bt211(t01−d1)
t211+θρσ
2
1
− b2t611−θρσ21b2t411
2θ(t211+θρσ
2
1)
2 and α2 =
bt212(t02−d2)
t212+ρσ
2
2
− b2t412(t212−ρσ22)
2(t212+ρσ
2
i )
2 .
The optimal penalty/incentive rates β1 =
bt211
t211+θρσ
2
1
and β2 =
bt212
t212+ρσ
2
2
. And the manager’s
optimal effort levels e1 =
bt311
θ(t211+θρσ
2
1)
and e2 =
bt312
t211+ρσ
2
2
.
The solution shows that, compared to that in the absence of cost salience under pure
moral hazard, the project manager would like to lower the optimal penalty/incentive rate
for the second task and the contractor would make less effort for the second task. The
other contract strategies have no change. Besides, compared to the solution with cost
salience under dual symmetric information, the project manager prefers to distort the
optimal penalty/incentive rate up to be positive for motivating the contractor to exert
optimal effort. According to the result in Proposition 4, the manager’s optimal expected
profit is obtained in the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Under moral hazard with symmetric cost salience information, the project
manager’s optimal expected profit
Π4 = a− b(t10 + t20) + b
2t412
2(t212 + ρσ
2
2)
+
b2t411
2θ(t211 + θρσ
2
1)
.
5.3. Optimal solution with cost salience under pure adverse selection
In this scenario, the contractor’s cost salience is his private information but his efforts
are observable to the project manager, which transforms our analysis into an information
screening problem. In order to reveal the contractor’s cost salience degree, the project
manager has to design a menu of incentive contacts to screen it. Consequently, the project
manager’s problem is
max
(αi(x),βi(x),ei)
E[V (T )−W1(θ, T1)−W2(θ, T2)]
subject to:
CEi(θ, θ) > CEi(θ, θ˜), ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2 (IC2)
CEi(θ, θ) > 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2. (IR)
We can derive the closed form of the optimal deadline-based incentive contract and the
contractor’s optimal efforts e1 and e2, both of which are formalized in Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5. Under pure adverse selection with cost salience, the contractor’s optimal
effort levels for task 1 and task 2 are e1 =
bt11
θ
and e2 = bt12, respectively. The optimal
fixed wages α1 =
b2t211
2θ
2 for task 1 and α2 =
b2t212
2
for task 2. The optimal penalty/incentive
rates β1 = β2 = 0.
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As seen in Proposition 5, the project manager would require the contractor to carry
out the optimal effort based on the project revenue in unit decreased time and his effort
productivity in each task. We can find the deadline-based incentive contract only consists
of fixed wages which are equal to the contractor’s cost of efforts. Moreover, compared to
the case under dual asymmetric information, the difference in the optimal solution is that
the project manager would adjust the optimal effort level and the fixed wage in the first
task to be lower. Based on Proposition 5, we can derive the manager’s optimal expected
profit in the following corollary.
Corollary 5. Under pure adverse selection with cost salience, the project manager’s op-
timal expected profit
Π5 = a− b(t10 + t20) + b2
(
t212
2
+
t211
2θ
)
.
5.4. Optimal solution with cost salience under dual asymmetric information
In this scenario, the contractor’s cost salience is his private information and his efforts
are unobservable to the project manager, which transforms our analysis into dual asym-
metric information problem. Consequently, to guarantee the contractor report real cost
salience degree and make proper efforts, the project manager’s problem is
max
(αi(x),βi(x))
E[V (T )−W1(θ, T1)−W2(θ, T2)]
subject to:
ei = argmax
eˆi>0
CEi(θ, θ), ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2 (IC1)
CEi(θ, θ) > CEi(θ, θ˜), ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2 (IC2)
CEi(θ, θ) > 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], i = 1, 2. (IR)
The following proposition characterizes the optimal menu of deadline-based incentive
contracts that the project manager should follow and the contractor’s optimal effort levels
in the presence of dual asymmetric information.
Proposition 6. Under dual asymmetric information, the optimal fixed compensation
α1 =
∫ θ
θ
t311(2bθ−t11h(θ))
4θ3(t211+θρσ
2
1)
dθ+ t11(2bθ−t11h(θ))(t01−d1)
2θ(t211+θρσ
2
1)
− t211(t211−θρσ21)(2bθ−t11h(θ))2
8θ3(t211+θρσ
2
1)
2 and α2 =
bt212(t02−d2)
t212+ρσ
2
2
−
b2t412(t
2
12−ρσ22)
2(t212+ρσ
2
2)
2 . The optimal penalty/incentive rates β1 =
t11(2bθ−t11h(θ))
2θ(t211+θρσ
2
1)
and β2 =
bt212
t212+ρσ
2
2
.
The manager’s optimal effort levels e1 =
t211(2bθ−t11h(θ))
2θ2(t211+θρσ
2
1)
and e2 =
bt312
t211+ρσ
2
2
.
Proposition 6 presents the qualitative solutions for the penalty/incentive and fixed
parameters of the deadline-based contract as well as the contractor’s optimal efforts even
in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard. An important outcome of
our solution is the manner where the both hazard rate h(x) which is linked to adverse
selection and project risk σ21 which is linked to moral hazard enter the incentive term.
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Hence we are able to clarify how adverse selection and moral hazard impact incentives
for the time-based projects. First, as seen in Proposition 6, the penalty/incentive rate
for task 1 decreases in the hazard rate h(x). That is, in order to prevent the contrac-
tor from concealing true information and mimicking other degrees of cost salience, the
project manager would bring down the penalty/incentive rate for avoiding such strategic
manipulation. Second, the penalty/incentive rate for task 1 also decreases in the project
risk in task 1. Thus, the project manager should reduce the penalty/incentive rate if the
project’s volatility is higher. That is because the risk-averse contractor exerts low effort
under high risk, which in turn causes the project manager just provides low incentive
for him. Proposition 6 also offers an important observation regarding the contractor’s
compensation and optimal effort for task 2 which are the same as that under pure moral
hazard with symmetric cost salience. Thus, the adverse selection has no impact on the
contract strategy and the effort level for the second task. Thus, it unnecessary to consider
the private information for the project manager when designing contract strategy of the
second task. The following corollary characterizes the manager’s optimal expected profit
under dual asymmetric information with cost salience.
Corollary 6. Under dual asymmetric information with cost salience, the project man-
ager’s optimal expected profit
Π6 = a− b(t10 + t20) + b
2t412
2(t212 + ρσ
2
2)
+
1
8
∫ θ
θ
(2θbt11 − t211h(θ))2
θ3(t211 + θρσ
2
1)
f(θ)dθ.
6. Impacts of Cost Salience and Information Asymmetry
In this section, first, we examine the effects of the existence of cost salience on the
project manager’s profits. We also investigate the contractor’s private information about
his cost salience degree on the project manager’s profits. Finally, we determine how
the contractor’s unobservable efforts influence the project manager’s profits. We aim at
discovering several important managerial insights that how to diminish the impacts of
cost salience and information asymmetry.
6.1. The impacts of cost salience on the project manager’s profit
When the project manager does not have the cost salience, he does not prefer to distort
his effort between two tasks. In contrast, if the project manager amplifies the costs of the
present effort, he would have the tendency to delay work. How is the project performance
susceptible to the manager’s procrastinating behavior? We would derive the effect of the
existence of cost salience by comparing the project manager’s profits with cost salience
and that without cost salience. Specifically, we denote CV1 = Π1−Π3 and CV2 = Π2−Π4
as the values of cost salience under full information and the profit difference under moral
hazard, respectively.
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Proposition 7. The existence of cost salience induces a loss of the project manager’s
profit. Moreover, as the contractor attaches greater cost salience to the present moment,
the project manager would suffer from greater loss. However, moral hazard can weaken the
extent of inverse impact caused by the existence of cost salience for the project manager.
Proposition 7 shows that the manager’s procrastinating behavior is always harmful to
the project manager. That is because, first, the cost salience makes the contractor exert
less effort in the first task, which extends the project’s duration and then cut down the
manager’s profit; second, the cost salience makes the contractor amplify his cost of effort so
that the manager has to pay more than before. Furthermore, the larger the contractor’s
cost salience degree, the more likely the contractor to procrastinate. It brings about
that the manager is forced to bear the project delay, which induces a loss of the project
manager’s profit. In addition, we demonstrate that the loss induced by the presence of
cost salience is lower under moral hazard than that under full information. That is, moral
hazard can weaken the extent of inverse impact caused by the existence of cost salience
for the project manager. This result is expected from the project manager’s perspective
as it is difficult to monitor the contractor’s efforts in most cases.
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Figure 2: The values of cost salience with σ1 = 0.5 and ρ = 2
Fig. 2 presents two numerical examples regarding the influence of t11 and b on the
values of cost salience. With respect to the effect of the existence of cost salience under
full information, the loss of project manager’s profit is increasing in both contract’s effort
marginal impact t11 in the first task and the marginal revenue b the project manager
gains by unit time. This phenomena can be explained by Corollaries 1 and 3 in which the
project manager’s expected profits increase in t11 and b and the difference of the profits
is positive. Regarding to the impact caused by the presence of cost salience under moral
hazard, the loss induced by the existence of cost salience is increasing in b. Interestingly,
it is increasing in t11 when t11 is lower and decreasing when t11 is higher. This result holds
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because under moral hazard the contractor can adjust his own effort level based on his
effort marginal impact t11. When t11 is smaller, the contractor intends to procrastinate
so as to reduce effort cost. However, when t11 is bigger, the contractor would input more
effort to the first task in order to complete project earlier and receive more payment, in
which case the cost salience does not make a difference in the contractor’s effort. Hence,
when t11 is bigger under moral hazard, the effect of the existence of cost salience becomes
smaller. Comparing with Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) also verifies that inverse impact caused
by the existence of cost salience for the project manager is lower under moral hazard than
that under perfect information.
6.2. The value of the contractor’s unobservable effort
Under moral hazard, the effort levels e1 and e2 in both tasks become his decision
variables rather than that of the manager. As a result, the manager cannot get the same
solution under moral hazard as that under no moral hazard. We refer to the difference in
the project manager’s profits as the value of unobservable effort.
According to whether the project manager can observe the contractor’s efforts or not,
we define two forms of the value of unobservable effort. In specific, when the contractor’s
cost salience level is public information, we denote the value of information about his
unobservable efforts as EV1 = Π3 − Π4, where Π3 and Π4 are given in Corollaries 3
and 4, respectively. Similarly, when the contractor’s truthful cost salience is not known
by the project manager, the value of information about his private effort is defined by
EV2 = Π5 − Π6, where Π5 and Π6 are given in Corollaries 5 and 6, respectively.
We derive the result regarding the impact of the contractor’s moral hazard on the
project manager’s profit which is expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 8. No matter whether cost salience is public information or not, moral
hazard is always detrimental to the project manager.
Fig. 3 numerically depicts the values of unobservable efforts under symmetric cost
salience information. As shown in Fig. 3(a), the value of unobservable efforts is always
increasing in t11 and t12. If the effort marginal output is in a high level, the manager will
suffer more loss if the contractor shirk effort due to moral hazard. Therefore, the higher
the effort marginal output in task 1 or task 2 is, the more preferable the project manager
is to provide effort incentive. Fig. 3(b) shows that the value of unobservable effort under
symmetric cost salience information increases as the project risk in each task improves.
Hence, for mitigating the adverse impacts brought by moral hazard, the project manager
is more willing to contract on the contractor’s efforts when the project risk is in a higher
level.
Fig. 4 visually shows the influence of t11, t12, σ1 and σ2 on EV2. It is obvious that
the value of unobservable efforts under asymmetric cost salience information increases
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Figure 3: The values of unobservable efforts under symmetric cost salience information
Notes. Parameters are as follows: b = 1, σ1 = 0.5, σ2 = 0.5 and ρ = 10 in Fig. 3(a); b = 1, t11 = 1, t12 = 1
and ρ = 10 in Fig. 3(b).
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Figure 4: The values of unobservable efforts under asymmetric cost salience information
Notes. Parameters are as follows: b = 1, σ1 = 0.5, σ2 = 0.5 and ρ = 20 in Fig. 4(a); b = 1, t11 = 1, t12 = 1
and ρ = 10 in Fig. 4(b).
in both the effort marginal output in each task and the project risks in both tasks, i.e.,
incremental parameters (t11, t12, σ1 and σ2) would enlarge the inverse impact induced by
moral hazard. As a result, with regard to more productive efforts (higher t11 and t12)
and greater project risks (higher σ1 and σ2) under asymmetric cost salience information,
an incentive mechanism for contracting on the contractor’s efforts and impelling him to
exert optimal efforts is more desirable for the project manager.
6.3. The value of information about the contractor’s private cost salience
In the setting of symmetric cost salience, the contractor’s cost salience degree is public
information. However, under asymmetric cost salience information, the project manager
must provide the contractor with information rent so as to prevent him from misreporting
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his type of cost salience. The informational rent, which can be interpreted as the value
of the contractor’s private information about his cost salience degree, is reflected by the
difference between the project manager’s profits under symmetric cost salience cases and
those under asymmetric cost salience cases.
According to whether the project manager observes the contractor’s efforts or not, we
define two forms of the value of information about the contractor’s private cost salience.
In specific, when the contractor’s efforts are observable, we denote the value of information
about the contractor’s private cost salience information as IV1 = Π3 −Π5, where Π3 and
Π5 are given in Corollaries 3 and 5, respectively.
Similarly, when the contractor’s efforts are unobservable, the value of information
about the contractor’s private cost salience information is defined by IV2 = Π4 − Π6,
where Π4 and Π6 are given in Corollaries 4 and 6, respectively.
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Figure 5: The values of information about cost salience
Notes. Parameters are as follows: σ1 = 0.5 and ρ = 2 in Fig. 5(a); b = 1 and t11 = 2 in Fig. 5(b).
We conduct two numerical experiments to display the value of information about the
contractor’s private cost salience information and demonstrate the influence of parameters
on the information value. Specifically, Fig. 5(a) illustrates the impacts of t11 and b on the
information value with and without observable efforts. The implication of this figure is
twofold. First, no matter whether the project manager can observe the contractor’s efforts,
the information value is increasing in t11 and b. In other words, regardless of whether the
contractor’s effort is observable or not, the project manager is always willing to learn the
contractor’s truthful cost salience degree when t11 or b is bigger. Second, the information
value with moral hazard is higher than that without moral hazard (IV1 < IV2). Therefore,
when the contractor’s efforts are unobservable, it is more beneficial for the project manager
to screen the contractor’s cost salience degree. Fig. 5(b) reveals the impact of σ1 and ρ
on IV2. The result shows that the information value under moral hazard is decreasing
in both the project risk in the first task and the contractor’s coefficient of risk aversion.
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This suggests that from the project manager’s perspective, on the one hand, acquiring
the contractor’s cost salience information becomes more valuable when the project risk in
the first task is low. On the other hand, a much less conservative contractor with private
information is disadvantageous to the project manager. In this situation, the project
manager ought to know the contractor’s cost salience information more accurately.
7. Conclusion and Future Research
From the perspective of project manager, this paper studies how to design the opti-
mal deadline-based incentive contract for a contractor who is endowed with private cost
salience information and unobservable efforts. With regard to the effects of the existence
of cost salience on the incentive contracts, as cost salience gives rise to effort procrastina-
tion, we show that cost salience can let project manager weaken the fixed payment under
full information and penalty/incentive rate under moral hazard. In the premise of hav-
ing cost salience, compared to the contract strategy under dual symmetric information,
the project manager should offer a low fixed wage and revise the penalty/incentive rate
upwards under pure moral hazard. Furthermore, under both moral hazard and adverse
selection, we pinpoint qualitative interplays between deadline-based incentive contract
structure and the effects of dual asymmetric information.
We also characterize the effects of the existence of cost salience and information asym-
metry. The results suggest that the presence of cost salience induces a loss of the project
manager’s profit. Moreover, the greater the manager attaches salience to the present
moment, the higher the loss will be. Specially, moral hazard is helpful to the project
manager to mitigate the negative impact caused by the contractor’s cost salience. In ad-
dition, lower effort productivity in the first task and lower project marginal time revenue
are also advantage to the project manager to cut down the loss caused by cost salience.
Afterwards, with regard to the impact of moral hazard on the project manager’s profit,
we show that the project manager is more willing to contract on the contractor’s efforts
and provide effort incentive in higher effort productivity or higher project risk of either
task no matter whether cost salience is public information or not. Lastly, by highlighting
the role of asymmetric information about cost salience degree, we find that it is more
preferable for the project manager to screen the contractor’s real cost salience degree and
decrease the extent of information asymmetry so as to reduce information rent when the
contractor has higher effort productivity in the first task, less conservative or the project
has lower risk in the first task.
Our model does not take the project quality into consideration. The contractor’s effort
procrastination caused by cost salience may result in remedying quality issues that surface
later (Wu et al. 2014). It would be interesting and worthwhile to combine time-incentive
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and quality-incentive in order to not only shorten the project completion time but also
improve the project quality.
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Based on the expected value criterion, the project manager’s
expected profit can be written as
E[V (T )−W1(1, T1)−W2(1, T2)] = a− b
2∑
i=1
[t0i − t1iei]−
2∑
i=1
[αi − βi(Ti − di)] .
Because the project manager’s expected profit is decreasing in the fixed payments α1
and α2, at optimality, the individual rationality constraints for the contractor should be
binding, i.e., CE(1, 1) = 0. Thus, we can rewrite the project manager’s problem as
max
(αi,βi,ei)
a− b
2∑
i=1
[t0i − t1iei]−
2∑
i=1
[αi − βi(Ti − di)]
subject to:
αi − βi(Ti − di)− 1
2
ρβ2i σ
2
i −
e2i
2
= 0, i = 1, 2.
By substituting the fixed payments into the objective function, we obtain the project
manager’s expected profit:
a− b(t01 − t11e1 + t02 − t12e2)− e
2
1
2
− e
2
2
2
− 1
2
ρβ21σ
2
1 −
1
2
ρβ22σ
2
2,
which is decreasing in β1 and β2 and concave in e1 and e2. Thus, the project manager
would set both β1 and β2 to zero for getting a maximum profit. Besides, we can yield
the contractor’s optimal effort levels e1 = bt11 and e2 = bt12 by using the first-order
condition. Following the determinate individual rationality constraints which are binding,
the corresponding optimal fixed payments α1 and α2 for the contractor can be derived
immediately. The proof of the proposition is complete.
Proof of Proposition 2. Under moral hazard, the contractor will choose his efforts ei
in task i to maximize his own utility
αi − βi(Ti − di)− 1
2
ρβ2i σ
2
i −
eˆ2i
2
,
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which is concave in eˆi, i = 1, 2. The maximum is completely characterized by the first-
order condition and we derive e1 = t11β1 and e1 = t12β2. Furthermore, because the
project manager’s profit is decreasing in the fixed payments, at optimality, the individual
rationality constraints should be binding. Therefore, by substituting e1 and e2 into the
individual rationality constraints and then substituting the fixed payments (α1 and α2)
and the effort levels (e1 and e2) into the objective function, the project manager’s expected
profit can be rewritten as
a− b(t01 + t02) +
2∑
i=1
[
bt21iβi −
1
2
t21iβ
2
i −
1
2
ρβ2i σ
2
i
]
.
By the first-order condition regarding to β1 and β1, we can obtain β1 =
bt211
t211+ρσ
2
1
and
β2 =
bt212
t212+ρσ
2
2
. Based on the binding individual rationality constraints, the optimal fixed
payments (α1 and α2) can be obtained immediately. The proof of the proposition is com-
plete.
Proof of Proposition 3. Similar to the Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Similar to the Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let CE(θ, θ) = CE1(θ, θ) + CE2(θ, θ). The incentive compati-
bility constraints for adverse selection can be written as
CE(θ, θ) > CE(θ, θ˜), ∀θ, θ˜ ∈ [θ, θ],
which means that CE(θ, θ˜) obtains its maximal value at CE(θ, θ), i.e., the contractor
can obtain his maximal profit CE(θ, θ˜) if and only if θ = θ˜. Thus, CE(θ, θ˜) satisfies the
first-order condition (i.e., local incentive compatibility constraint) ∂CE(θ,θ˜)
∂θ˜
∣∣
θ˜=θ
= 0 and
the second-order condition ∂
2CE(θ,θ˜)
∂θ˜2
∣∣
θ˜=θ
6 0. The local incentive compatibility constraint
2∑
i=1
[
dαi(θ)
dθ
− (t0i − t1iei − di)dβi(θ)
dθ
− ρσ2i βi(θ)
dβi(θ)
dθ
]
= 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ].
Differentiating CE(θ, θ) with respect to θ yields
2∑
i=1
[
dαi(θ)
dθ
− (t0i − t1iei − di)dβi(θ)
dθ
− ρσ2i βi(θ)
dβi(θ)
dθ
]
− e
2
1
2
= −e
2
1
2
6 0.
Thus, the individual rationality constraint is equivalent to
CE(θ, θ) > 0.
The constraint is binding under the optimal mechanism because the project manager
will reap the redundant profit, so that CE(θ, θ) = 0. Because CE(θ, θ) = 0 and dCE(θ,θ)
dθ
=
−e21/2, we can derive
CE(θ, θ) = CE(θ, θ) +
∫ θ
θ
e21
2
dθ =
e21
2
(θ − θ).
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Combining the definition of CE(θ, θ) yields
2∑
i=1
[
αi − βi(Ti − di)− 1
2
ρβ2i σ
2
i
]
− θe
2
1
2
− e
2
2
2
=
e21
2
(θ − θ).
By substituting the fixed wages into the objective function, we can derive
a− b(t01 − t11e1 + t02 − t12e2)− θe
2
1
2
− e
2
2
2
− 1
2
ρβ21σ
2
1 −
1
2
ρβ22σ
2
2,
which is decreasing in β1 and β2 and concave in e1 and e2. Thus, the project manager
would set both β1 and β2 to zero for getting a maximum profit. Besides, we can yield
the contractor’s optimal effort levels e1 = bt11/θ and e2 = bt12 by using the first-order
condition. Following the determinate individual rationality constraints which are binding,
the corresponding optimal fixed payments α1 and α2 for the contractor can be derived
immediately. The proof of the proposition is complete.
Proof of Proposition 6. Similar to the Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 7. The result is derived directly by comparing the project man-
ager’s profits which are shown in Corollaries 1-4.
Proof of Proposition 8. The result is derived directly by comparing the project man-
ager’s profits which are shown in Corollaries 3-6.
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